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United States Leading Case minority protectionconflict of interest s175

Kahn v M&F Worldwide Corp

88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014)
JurisdictionUnited States
CourtDelaware Supreme Court
Year2014
StatusBinding authority

Summary

Under Delaware law, a controlling shareholder merger conditioned ab initio on both special committee approval and majority-of-minority vote earns business judgment review rather than entire fairness scrutiny.

Key Principle

MFW framework; business judgment review for controller transactions with dual protections

Area of Law

Delaware Corporate Law

Related Cases

Corwin v KKR Financial Holdings LLC 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015)

Fully informed and uncoerced stockholder approval of a non-controller transaction cleanses it of fiduciary challenge and applies business judgment review.

In re Caremark International Inc Derivative Litigation 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)

Directors must implement adequate information and reporting systems to satisfy their fiduciary duty of oversight; failure to do so may constitute a breach of duty.

Blasius Industries Inc v Atlas Corp 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988)

Board actions that interfere with the shareholder franchise require a compelling justification, imposing a heightened standard of review under Delaware law.

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